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Abstract—In future practical deployments of massive multi-input
multi-output (MIMO) systems, the number of radio frequency (RF)
chains at the base stations (BSs) may be much smaller than the
number of BS antennas to reduce the overall expenditure. In this
correspondence, we propose a novel design framework for joint
data and artificial noise (AN) precoding in a multiuser massive
MIMO system with limited number of RF chains, which improves
the wireless security performance. With imperfect channel state
information (CSI), we analytically derive an achievable lower bound
on the ergodic secrecy rate of any mobile terminal (MT), for both
analog and hybrid precoding schemes. The closed-form lower bound
is used to determine optimal power splitting between data and AN
that maximizes the secrecy rate through simple one-dimensional
search. Analytical and numerical results together reveal that the
proposed hybrid precoder, although suffers from reduced secrecy
rate compared with theoretical full-dimensional precoder, is free of
the high computational complexity of large-scale matrix inversion
and null-space calculations, and largely reduces the hardware cost.
Index Terms—artificial noise, hybrid precoder, imperfect CSI,
limited RF chains, massive MIMO, physical layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emerging massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
architecture is known to support more secure transmissions, as the
large-scale antenna array equipped at the transmitter (Alice) can
accurately form directional and narrow information beam pointing
at the intended receiver (Bob), such that the signal power level
at Bob is several orders of magnitude higher than that of any
incoherent passive eavesdropper (Eve) [1]. Unfortunately, these
benefits may vanish if Eve also employs large antenna array for
eavesdropping [2]. In this case, even a single passive Eve can
perform successful eavesdropping, if no extra efforts are made by
Alice. Since security is a critical concern for future communication
systems, how to exploit the abundance of antennas offered by
the large-scale array for secure massive MIMO system design is
necessary and of great significance.
The first investigation of massive MIMO systems from physical
layer security perspective was presented in [2]. It was shown that
a base station (BS) equipped with a large-scale antenna array is
capable of generating a powerful artificial noise (AN) [3] covering
a broad range of spatial dimensions, to mask the secret information
from the passive attacker Eve. Besides, secrecy performance can
be improved in multi-cell pilot contaminated scenario, even if
simple matched-filtering (MF) transmission is adopted, and the
number of terminals and the number of eavesdropper antennas
both grow large. The work was then extended in [4] by considering
various linear data and AN precoders, and in [5] by investigating
the impact of hardware impairments on the secrecy performance
of massive MIMO systems. The authors of [6] investigated the
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AN-aided jamming for Rician fading channels, while the work
presented in [7] compared two classic relaying schemes for secure
massive MIMO transmission. The authors in [8] studied the power
scaling law for both pilot emission and data transmission in order
to achieve a secure massive MIMO transmission without the help
of AN.
All the aforementioned works are based on the assumption
that each antenna element is supported by one dedicated radio
frequency (RF) chain. The complex baseband symbols are tuned
for both amplitude and phase. The baseband symbols are then
upconverted to the carrier frequency after passing through the RF
chains, whose outputs are coupled with the antennas. However, this
is too costly to deploy in practice due to the use of large antenna
array. Moreover, it hinders the operation of frequency division
duplex (FDD) massive MIMO implementations, as the number of
available pilot symbols is fundamentally limited by the channel
coherence time [9]. On the other hand, the rapid development
of circuitry technology enables the high dimensional phase-only
RF (or analog) processing. In [10] and [11], analog precoding
was employed to achieve full diversity order and near-optimal
beamforming performance by iterative algorithms. More practical
constrains such as quantized phase control and finite-precision
analog-to-digital (A/D) conversion are considered in [12]. In order
to further improve system performance, related literatures [13]–
[16] have considered hybrid schemes by combining digital and
analog preocoding. Specifically, a lower dimensional (limited by
the number of RF chains) baseband precoding is employed based
on the equivalent channel acquired from the product of the analog
RF precoder and the channel matrix [14]. However, there lacks
adequate considerations of how the limited RF chain constraint
affects security, and how to design transmission strategies to
improve system security under those practical constraints.
In this work, we consider secure downlink transmission of
massive MIMO systems, where the BS is equipped with large
antenna array and limited number of RF chains. The scenario
is of great practical interest as it will be highly expensive and
energy inefficient if each antenna element is connected with one
dedicated RF chain. The main contributions of this work are
summarized in the following. 1) A novel framework for linear
data and AN precoding under the constraint of limited RF chains
at the BS is proposed, and improved security of massive MIMO
is achieved. In particular, the analog AN precoder achieves the
minimum leakage, which is equivalent to the highly complex full-
dimensional (pure digital) AN precoder. For the hybrid scheme,
we show that as long as the number of RF chains is greater
than the number of mobile terminals (MTs), optimal AN precoder
for leakage minimization can be obtained at a cost (complexity)
much less than the full-dimensional counterpart. 2) With imperfect
channel state information (CSI) acquired via uplink training, we
derive an achievable lower bound on the ergodic secrecy rate
of any MT for both pure analog and hybrid precoders. The
Fig. 1. System model.
bound presented in closed-form provides insights for practical
secure system design, e.g., optimal power allocation [17] by
one-dimensional search. Analytical and numerical results together
reveal that the proposed hybrid precoder, although suffers from a
security performance loss when compared with the theoretical full-
dimensional precoder, avoids the high computational complexity
for large-scale matrix inversion and null-space calculation, and
greatly reduces the hardware cost.
II. SYSTEM MODELS
A. Multi-User Downlink MIMO Network Model
We consider the downlink of a multi-user MIMO system, as
depicted in Fig. 1. The BS is equipped with N transmit antennas
driven by L < N RF chains. This limits the number of transmit
streams to be no more than L. The BS simultaneously serves
K(K < L and K ≪ N) single-antenna MTs. There is also
an M -antenna eavesdropper, Eve, (equivalent to M cooperative
single-antenna eavesdroppers) located in the footprint of the BS.
The goal of Eve is to extract the data for a specific MT. Eve
works in passive mode [2], [4] in order to hide her presence
from the BS. 1 For downlink precoding, the BS adopts a data
precoder to broadcast information-bearing signals to all MTs and
an AN precoder to combat eavesdropping. Both the data and AN
precoders perform digital basedband and analog RF processing.
For baseband precoders W ∈ CL1×K and V ∈ CL2×L3 , both am-
plitude and phase are adjustable. While RF precoders F ∈ CN×L1
and A ∈ CN×L2 are only phase shifters. The indices L1, L2, and
L3 are precoder dimensions to be determined, cf. Section IV-A,
and in general L1 + L3 ≤ L,L3 ≤ L2 ≤ L. Each entry of F and
A is normalized to satisfy |[F]ij | = |[A]i,j | = 1√
N
. To this end,
the received baseband signals at MT k and Eve are given by
yk = g
H
k FWs+ g
H
k AVz+ nk, (1)
and
ye = G
H
EFWs+G
H
EAVz+ ne (2)
respectively, where gk =
√
βkhk ∈ CN×1 and GE ∈ CN×M
denote the downlink channel from the BS to MT k and Eve. βk and
hk represent the path-loss and the small-scale fading component
between the BS and MT k. s ∈ CK×1 with E[ssH ] = φP
K
IK is the
complex signal vector intended for the K MTs, and z ∈ CL3×1
is the complex AN vector with E[zzH ] = (1−φ)P
L3
IL3 , where P
denotes the total power budget and φ ∈ (0, 1] is the power splitting
factor. In order to guarantee the total power constraint, we further
normalize F,W,A,V such that ‖FW‖2 = K and ‖AV‖2 = L3.
1In practice, Eve can also actively transmit jamming signals to confuse the
legitimate MTs. However, this also increases her chance of being detected [18].
nk and ne are the Gaussian noise at MT k and Eve, respectively.
The received SINR at MT k is then calculated as [2], [4] γk = 2
φP
K
E[|gHk Fwk|]2∑
l 6=k
φP
K
E[|gHk Fwl|2] + (1−φ)PL3 E[gHk AVVHAHgk] + σ2
(3)
for N → ∞, where wk(k = 1, . . . ,K) is the kth column of W
and σ2 is the Gaussian noise power. The corresponding achievable
rate at MT k is rk = log2(1 + γk).
B. Uplink Training and CSI Acquisition
The design of F,W,A,V requires CSI at the BS transmitters.
Uplink pilot training based channel estimation is adopted due
to channel reciprocity in the time-division duplex (TDD) mode,
which is typical for massive MIMO systems [2], [4]. Specifically,
at the training phase (beginning of each coherence block), each
MT transmits its own τ -length pilot sequence with pilot symbol
power pτ . The pilot sequences of the K MTs are assumed to be
orthogonal (we thus need τ ≥ K). Furthermore, it is reasonable to
assume that the path-loss βk(1 ≤ k ≤ K) is perfectly estimated
at the BS, as it changes in a much slower time scale than fast
fading. When minimum mean-square error (MMSE) estimation is
employed, the small-scale fading vector between the BS and MT
k is expressed as
hk = hˆk + e, (4)
where the estimate hˆk and the estimation error e are mutu-
ally independent and can be statistically characterized as hˆk ∼
CN(0N , λkIN ) and e ∼ CN(0N , (1 − λk)IN ), where λk =
pττβk
1+pττβk
∈ (0, 1). By stacking all hˆk(1 ≤ k ≤ K) together, we
have Hˆ = [hˆ1, hˆ2, . . . , hˆK ] ∈ CN×K .
C. Achievable Secrecy Rate
A noiseless eavesdropping assumption results in an upper bound
to the capacity of Eve aiming to extract the information for MT
k, i.e., Cke = E[log2
(
1 + γke
)
] [17], with γke =
L3φ
K(1− φ)w
H
k F
HGE
(
GHEAVV
HAHGE
)−1
GHEFwk. (5)
Based on (3) and (5), we obtain an achievable lower bound to the
ergodic secrecy rate of MT k, which is rseck = [rk−Cke ]+ [2], [4].
III. ANALOG DATA AND AN DOWNLINK PRECODING
In this section, we consider a pure analog precoder design by
adopting F ∈ CN×K and A ∈ CN×(L−K) without W and V. In
this case, the achievable rate of MT k reduces to ranak =
log2
(
1 +
φP
K
E[|gHk fk|]2∑
l 6=k
φP
K
E[|gHk fl|2] + (1−φ)PL−K E[gHk AAHgk] + σ2
)
,
(6)
with fl, l = 1, . . . ,K the lth column of F.
The baseband signal (both data and AN) [sH zH ]H ∈ CL×1
is delivered through L RF chains for analog shifting before
transmission, with the shifting matrix [F A] ∈ CN×L, where F
and A will be given in Sections III-A and III-B.
2The term E[|gHk Fwk|
2] − φP
K
(
E[|gHk Fwk|]
2
)
at the denominator is ne-
glected in (3) as it goes to zero for N →∞ [19, Theorem 4].
A. Analog Data Precoder Design and Performance Analysis
In this subsection, we consider the phase-only conjugate data
precoder for analog data precoding. Notably, the amplitude-
sensitive strategies, e.g., zero-forcing (ZF)/MMSE precoders are
not considered. For the conjugate precoder, we perform phase-
only regulation at the RF domain by capturing phases of the
conjugate transpose of the downlink channel from the BS to all
MTs. Mathematically, we have [F]i,j = 1√
N
ejφi,j , where φi,j
denotes the phase of the (i, j)th element of the conjugate transpose
of the estimated aggregate downlink channel, i.e., [hˆ1, . . . , hˆK ].
The effective signal strength and the multiuser interference power
in (6) can be calculated by following [15, Section III-B] as
E[|hHk fk|] =
√
piNλk
2
and E[|hHk fl|2] = 1, l 6= k. (7)
B. Analog AN Precoder Design and Performance Analysis
In this subsection, we consider the phase-only iterative null-
space (INS) AN precoder. Similar to Section III, the conventional
NS AN precoder, which is commonly adopted in the literature
limitations on RF chains, cf. [2], [4], is not addressed here,
because the precoder is sensitive to the amplitude. We propose
a novel phase-only AN precoder by iteratively finding the NS of
the aggregate MT channels. It can be verified that as long as N
is sufficiently large, we can always find L −K (limited) sets of
vectors, with each lying in the NS of the aggregate MT channels. In
this case, the AN leakage power reduces to zero, with the expense
of a high-computational iterative search algorithm.
IV. HYBRID DOWNLINK DATA AND AN PRECODING
To exploit the potential of massive MIMO to the maximum
extent under the limited RF chains constraint, we propose a low-
dimensional multi-stream processing at the baseband by making
use of the L spatial degrees of freedom (DoF). The precoded
baseband signals are then upconverted to the RF chains. A phase-
only control is adopted to match the L RF chain outputs with the
N antenna elements by using phase shifters.
A. Design Principles
We propose a novel hybrid data and AN precoder structure under
the limited RF chain constraint, which has not been considered in
the literature. It is necessary to provide some design principles and
criteria beforehand, which are given as follows.
Proposition 1: To support the data streams for K MTs, we need
L1 ≥ K . Also, to realize the NS-based AN as in [2], [4], i.e., AV
is designed such that HˆHAV = 0, L2 > K is also required.
Proof: The former part is because the matrix [g1, . . . ,gK ]HF
needs to be well-conditioned to support the multi-stream data
transmission, which implies the rank of the matrix should not be
smaller than the number of MTs K [15]. The latter part is due
to HˆHA ∈ CK×L2 . Thus, we need L2 > K to have sufficient
spatial DoF for AN transmission.
Proposition 1 implies that whatever A is designed, the null-
space of HˆHA can always be acquired at the baseband via the
digital AN precoder V, without any performance loss. This is
critical to simplification of the design, because A can, at least in
theory, be any matrix as long as rank[HˆHA] > K .
Proposition 2: The structure F = A ∈ CN×L with L1 = L2 =
L for analog phase shifter design is the best choice for achieving
the highest secrecy rate.
Proof: We have L1 = L because an extra data stream is
always beneficial to achieve a larger data rate. On the other hand,
according to [4, Eq. (7)], an extra spatial DoF adopted for AN
emission is always detrimental to the eavesdropper’s achieved
SINR given in (5), and we thus have L2 = L. Finally, we have
F = A to simplify the design, because the choice of A does
not affect the system performance, as long as the baseband AN
precoder is specifically designed, according to Proposition 1.
B. Analog Phase Shifting
As stated in Section IV-A, the analog phase shifter can be
designed in the same way as in the case with no AN. The purpose
of F is thus to harvest the array gain so as to achieve multi-stream
transmission. Under this criterion, we design F such that
[F]i,j =
{
1/
√
Nejφi,j for 1 ≤ j ≤ K,
1/
√
Nejψ for K + 1 ≤ j ≤ L, (8)
where ψ is uniformly distributed on [0, 2pi). For the limiting case
of L = K , F in (8) reduces to the form given in [15]. For general
cases, we simply generate random phases to fill the extra L−K
columns, which offers the extra L−K spatial DoF seen from the
baseband while keeping the low-complexity feature.
C. Baseband Data and AN Precoder Design
For baseband processing, we perform MF and ZF data precoding
and NS-based AN precoding. The precoder structure shares in
common with that of the fully digital precoders, but substantially
reduces the hardware complexity, because only L RF chains are
used, as compared to N for the fully digital precoders. For
presentation clarity, path-loss βk is not included in the analytical
results given this section, but will exist in the resulting ergodic
secrecy rate expressions in Section V.
1) Baseband Data Precoding: We consider two types of base-
band linear data precoders in the literature, i.e., [4, Section III-A]
W =


γMFF
HHˆ for MF,
γZFF
HHˆ
(
HˆHFFHHˆ
)−1
for ZF,
(9)
where γMF and γZF are scaling factors satisfying the total power
constraints ‖FW‖2 = K , which gives [4, Section III-A] γMF =√√√√ K
tr
(
HˆHFFHFFHHˆ
) , γZF =
√√√√√ K
tr
((
HˆHFFHHˆ
)−1) .
(10)
For baseband MF precoding, the signal strength is calculated as
E[|hHk Fwk|]
= γMFE[|hHk FFH hˆk|]
= γMFE[|hHk fkfHk hˆk|] + γMFE[|hHk F˜kF˜Hk hˆk|]
(a)
= γMFE[‖hˆk‖ · ‖hˆk‖] +
∑
l 6=k
γMFE[|hkl|2]
(b)
= γMFλk
[pi
4
(N − 1) + L
]
, (11)
where F˜k ∈ CN×(L−1) is by removing the column of fk from
F, and hkl = hˆHk fl. In (11), (a) uses (8), while (b) exploits
E[‖hˆk‖ · ‖hˆk‖] = pi4 (N − 1) + 1 [15, Section III-B] and∑
l 6=k γMFE[|hkl|2] = L− 1 due to (7).
The scaling factor γMF is given by
γMF=
√
1
|hˆHk FFH hˆHk |
(a)
=
√
1
λk
(
pi
4 (N − 1) + L
) , (12)
where (a) uses (11). On the other hand, the intra-cell multiuser
interference power is calculated as
E[|hHk Fwl|2]
= γ2MFE[|hHk FFH hˆl|2]
= γ2MFE
[∣∣∣∣hHk fkfHk hˆl + hHk flfHl hˆl + ∑
j 6=k,l
hHk fjf
H
j hˆl
∣∣∣∣
2]
(a)≈ γ2MFE[|hHk fkfHk hˆl + hHk flfHl hˆl|2]
= γ2MFE[|‖hk‖ · hlk + ‖hˆl‖ · hkl|2]
= 2γ2MFλk
[
pi(N − 1)
4
+ 1
]
=
pi(N−1)
2 + 1
pi(N−1)
4 + L
L≪N≈ 2, (13)
where (a) uses
∑
j 6=k,l h
H
k fjf
H
j hˆl ≪ hHk fkfHk hˆl or hHk flfHl hˆl
when K ≪ N .
For baseband ZF precoding, the signal strength is calculated as
E[|hHk Fwk|] = γZF , (14)
where γZF is given by [15, Theorem 1]
γZF =
√√√√√ K
trace
((
HˆHFFHHˆ
)−1) =
√
pi
4
λk(N − 1) (15)
for K ≪ N . The multiuser interference power under ZF precoding
is calculated as
E[|hHk Fwl|2] = E[|eHFwl|2] = 1− λk, (16)
due to E[|hˆHk Fwl|2] = 0 for ZF precoder and the independence
between e and Fwl.
2) Baseband AN Precoding: All baseband data precoders share
the same AN precoder, which is
V = null
(
HˆHA
)
∈ CL×(L−K). (17)
As such, the AN power leaking to MT k is given by
E[hHk AVV
HAHhk] = E[e
HAVVHAHe] =(L−K)(1− λk),
(18)
due to E[hˆHk AVVhAhhˆk] = 0 for the AN precoder given in (17),
and the independence between e and AV.
V. ACHIEVABLE ERGODIC SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the achievable ergodic secrecy rate
of the massive MIMO downlink with limited RF chains. To this
end, we present an asymptotic analysis for the downlink data rate
of the legitimate MTs when analog/hybrid precoding is adopted
by the BS in Section V-A. In Section V-B, a simple closed-form
upper bound for Eve’s capacity is derived. The analytical bound
for the resulting ergodic secrecy rate is obtained in Section V-C.
The bound is important as it has a tractable form, which allows
further investigation in system design, e.g., finding the optimal
power allocation that maximized the ergodic secrecy rate.
TABLE I
SINR OF MT k FOR ANALOG/HYBRID PRECODING
Precoder Type γk
Analog (ANA)
φP
K (
pi
4
λkN)
φP
K
(K−1)+(1−φ)P (1−λk)+σ
2/βk
Hybrid-MF (HMF)
φP
K (
pi
4
λk(N−1)+L)
φP
K
2(K−1)+(1−φ)P (1−λk)+σ
2/βk
Hybrid-ZF (HZF)
φP
K
pi
4
λk(N−1)
φP
K
(K−1)(1−λk)+(1−φ)P (1−λk)+σ
2/βk
Full-MF (FMF)
φP
K
(λkN)
φP
K
(K−1)+(1−φ)P (1−λk)+σ
2/βk
Full-ZF (FZF)
φP
K
λk(N−K)
φP
K
(K−1)(1−λk)+(1−φ)P (1−λk)+σ
2/βk
A. Achievable Rate Analysis
By plugging all intermediate results obtained in Section IV-C
including (11)-(18) and path-loss βk into (3) (for hybrid precoding)
and (6) (for analog precoding), we obtain the resulting SINR
achieved by MT k for different types of analog/hyrbid precoding,
which are summarized in Table I. The effect of imperfect CSI is
manifested by the parameter λk. When λk = 1, all results reduce
to the case of perfect CSI. Exploiting the results in Table I, we
obtain the following relations between γANAk , γHZFk , and γFZFk :
γHZFk
γANAk
N→∞−→ 1 + 4(K − 1)
piN
γHZFk ,
γFZFk
γHZFk
K≪N−→ 4(N −K)
pi(N − 1) ,
(19)
We note that
γFZFk > γ
HZF
k > γ
ANA
k (20)
is guaranteed for N → ∞ and K ≪ N , although γANAk is
achieved by high-computational iterative search, cf. Section III-B.
Similarly, we obtain the relations in γANAk , γHMFk , and γFMFk
γHMFk
γANAk
N→∞−→ 1 + 4(K − 1)
piλkN
(
L
K − 1 − γ
HMF
k
)
. (21)
γHMFk
γFMFk
N→∞−→ pi
4
+
K − 1
λkN
(
L
K − 1 − γ
HMF
k
)
. (22)
Note that the achievable rate of all precoders goes large for N →
∞ and K,L≪ N , the two conditions are unlikely to be met. To
this end, we generally have
γFMFk > γ
ANA
k > γ
HMF
k . (23)
Remark 1: By comparing (20) and (23), we observe that ZF
precoding is desirable for hybrid design, as HZF always outper-
forms pure analog precoding, while HMF does not. This is mainly
because HZF can fully exploit the advantage of digital design.
In particular, still according to Table I, the relation between the
two hybrid precoders can be obtained as
γHZFk
γHMFk
=
piλk(N − 1)
piλk(N − 1) + 4L +
4(1 + λk)(K − 1)
piλk(N − 1) + 4Lγ
HZF
k , (24)
which gives γHZFk > L(1+λk)(K−1) to guarantee γ
HZF
k > γ
HMF
k .
The discussion in this subsection will be verified in Section VI.
B. Upper Bound on Eavesdropper’s Capacity
From the statistical perspective, whether analog or hybrid pre-
coding is employed at the BS is irrelevant to the calculation of
Eve’s capacity, as the precoder design is independent of Eve’s
channel, which is unknown by the BS. Consequently, here we
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Fig. 2. Ergodic secrecy rate comparison for different data and AN precoders, for
a system with K = 3,M = 5, L = 10, P = 10 dB, pτ = 0 dB, and φ = 0.5.
follow [2, Theorem 2] to give an identical upper bound on Eve’s
capacity for both the analog and hybrid precoders.
CE ≤ CE = log2
(
1 +
φM
K(1− φ)(1 − M
L−K )
)
(25)
for N → ∞ and L −K > M . We note that this bound provides
an explicit relationship between Eve’s capacity and various system
parameters, e.g., L,K,M, φ.
C. Ergodic Secrecy Rate
By combining results from Sections V-A and V-B, we finally
obtain the analytical bound for the ergodic secrecy rate achieved
by any MT, which is [2]
rseck =
[
log2(1 + γ
Ψ
k )− CE
]+
, (26)
where γΨk is given in Table I with Ψ =
{ANA,HMF,HZF,FMF,FZF}, and CE is given in (25).
Based on (26), we can easily find the optimal φ∗ that maximizes
the ergodic secrecy rate via a simple one-dimensional search, cf.
Section VI, given the ratio M
N
is smaller than a certain value
that can be easily calculated for each precoding scheme by using
expressions of γk given in Table I.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we verify the analytical results presented in
Sections III and IV through numerical and simulation results, and
illustrate the impacts of the limited RF chains constraint on the
system security performance. The numerical results are obtained
by evaluating the analytical expression for the lower bound on the
ergodic secrecy rate obtained in (26). Monte Carlo simulations are
based on 5,000 independent channel realizations.
In Fig. 2, we plot the ergodic secrecy rate as a function of
the number of BS antennas (with fixed number of RF chains)
for different pairs of data and AN precoders. We observe that
the hybrid ZF precoder outperforms the pure analog precoder,
which outperforms the hybrid MF precoder, when the number
of BS antennas is much greater than the number of MTs and
RF chains. Moreover, as expected, hybrid precoders result in a
performance loss compared to their full counterparts, but have
much lower computational complexity, especially for ZF. Finally,
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Fig. 3. Ergodic secrecy rate comparison for hybrid precoders as functions of φ,
for a system with N = 128, K = 3,M = 5, P = 10 dB, and pτ = 0 dB.
it has been verified that the lower bounds on the secrecy rate
derived in Sections IV and V are tight for all pairs of precoders
by comparing the simulation results.
Fig. 3 compares the ergodic secrecy rate achieved by the hybrid
precoders for different numbers of RF chains. The ergodic secrecy
rate is plotted as a function of the power allocation factor φ ∈
(0, 1). We observe that the secrecy rate is monotonically increasing
in the number of RF chains equipped at the BS for all values of
φ, while the corresponding computational complexity consumed
by the precoder is also expected to increase with the L. Another
non-trivial observation is: given L, the optimal φ maximizing the
secrecy rate for the ZF precoder is greater than that for the MF
precoder. In other words, the BS inclines to allocate more resources
(e.g., power) for AN transmission when MF precoder is adopted.
One possible explanation is, both precoders result in identical AN
leakage, cf. (18), while the MF precoder leads to extra multiuser
interference, cf. Table I. Thus, it is wiser to allocate more power
to data transmission when ZF precoder is used.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this correspondence, we have proposed a novel design frame-
work for downlink data and AN precoding in a multiuser massive
MIMO system with limited number of RF chains, which improves
the wireless security performance. With CSI acquired via uplink
training, we derived an achievable lower bound on the ergodic
secrecy rate of any MT, for both pure analog and hybrid precoders.
Analytical and numerical results revealed that the proposed hybrid
precoder, although suffers from a security performance loss when
compared with the theoretical full-dimensional precoder, is free of
the high computational complexity for large-scale matrix inversion
and null-space calculations, and largely reduces the hardware cost.
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